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1 Introduction  
Entrepreneurship, or the formation of new businesses, is closely related to the growth of 
the U.S. economy and the welfare of its participants.  It is widely accepted that successful 
entrepreneurships lead to accelerated productivity growth and increased job formation, as well as 
innovation across industries.  Evidence of these contributions has increased people’s awareness 
and focus on “start-ups” in recent years and there appears to be heightened publicity around so-
called “start-up culture.”  Much of recent U.S. policy aimed to provide incentives to new 
entrepreneurs in order to increase rates of business formation and strengthen the economy.  In 
2011, President Obama launched a White House initiative, “StartUp America,” aimed at 
inspiring and accelerating high-growth entrepreneurship throughout the United States1.  Among 
the proposed goals of the plan was lowering barriers to entrepreneurship in underserved 
communities.  In contrast, none of President Trump’s recent policy has addressed 
entrepreneurship and it is unclear as to whether he intends to take action on it in the future. 
Hopes to renew the entrepreneurial dynamism of America’s industries, which many see as a 
“source of competitive advantage” among world economies, have also contributed to various 
city- and state-level policy efforts to attract entrepreneurs in these locations.  While some aspects 
of these initiatives seek to benefit all nascent entrepreneurs, other provisions direct attention 
specifically toward empowering immigrants to start new businesses through the reformation of 
visa programs.  
Immigrants are thought to be essential to both entrepreneurship and innovation.  Across 
the United States, there is a consistent and growing overrepresentation of immigrants in the 
formation of new businesses.  Even in states with the lowest immigrant shares of the population, 
the shares of immigrant-founded new businesses are roughly double the immigrant shares of the 
state population.  As the share of immigrants who are business owners in the United States 
grows, it is essential to narrow the focus of current government policy and economic literature on 
the presence and contributions of immigrants to entrepreneurship.   
In the current economic literature, immigrant entrepreneurs are remarkably understudied.  
There has been considerable debate over the effect of immigrants in the workforce on the native-
                                                




born2 population, especially on their potential to displace native workers or depress wages.  
Consequently, the majority of current literature on immigrants focuses on the externalities of 
immigration that affect the welfare of the native-born population, rather than the welfare of 
immigrants themselves.  Such research, when it posits that immigration is detrimental to the non-
immigrant population, is often cited in arguments for limiting the immigrant population in the 
U.S.  President Trump’s recent executive actions on immigration, while motivated by many 
factors, are often rationalized using these arguments.  However, it is clear that such orders reveal 
a hostility toward immigrants with the strong potential to impact the number of immigrant 
entrepreneurs residing in the United States, as well as those with intentions to become business-
owners.  
Within the domain of study on immigrant entrepreneurship, many have deeply considered 
the individual qualities of immigrants that make them more or less likely to be entrepreneurs and 
the qualities that distinguish immigrant-founded firms from native-founded firms.  Despite these 
efforts, an examination of the regional and local factors that affect the shares and growth of 
immigrant entrepreneurship in the United States, as well as research-based public policy 
recommendations to encourage immigrant entrepreneurship, remain absent from the current 
analysis.  Before proceeding with such programs as StartUp America, or executive actions on 
immigration, the lack of definitive conclusions on what encourages immigrants to start forming 
businesses in specific locations must be corrected.  The dearth of concern for this topic makes it 
essential to discover the specific drivers of entrepreneurship for immigrants, rather than, simply, 
the spillover effects of immigrant entrepreneurship.  
Specifically, this thesis focuses on determining the individual and state-level factors that 
impact the share of immigrant-owned businesses in the United States.  This study also considers 
the effect of the H-1B temporary visa program on rates of immigrant entrepreneurship across 
states.  The shares of immigrant-owned new3 firms, as well as the growth rates of these shares, 
vary greatly across states.  In 2012, for example, the share of immigrant-founded new businesses 
in California was 42 percent and 2.4 percent in South Dakota.  Additionally, in states such as 
                                                
2 To describe non-immigrants, native-born, native, and non-immigrant are used interchangeably.   
3 “New firms” are defined as any firm founded within the 5 years prior to the dates the Survey of 
Business Owners was conducted.  For example, any firm founded from 2003 to 2007 would be 
considered a “new” firm among those surveyed in the SBO.   
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Tennessee the share of new businesses founded by immigrants rose 16.7 percent from 2007 to 
2012, while it fell by 5.4 percent in New Mexico during the same time frame.  Figures 1 and 2 
and Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the immigrant shares of new businesses across states, as well as 
their changes over time.  The extraordinary differences between the shares and growth rates of 
immigrant entrepreneurship across states provide significant motivation for understanding the 
factors that make business formation a desirable option for some individuals and not others.  
Furthermore, this study will address the extent to which these factors affect immigrants and non-
immigrants differently.  The analysis employs data from the 2007 and 2012 Survey of Business 
Owners, American Community Survey, County Business Patterns, and Community 
Reinvestment Act.  These datasets supply the dependent variable, an indicator of whether an 
individual is self-employed, as well as the information used to construct the individual- and 
state-level factors included as independent variables in the OLS regression models.  
Additionally, this research considers the effect of the H-1B visa program on the shares of 
immigrant entrepreneurs across states.  The impacts of the factors that influence an immigrant’s 
likelihood to be self-employed, and the effects of H-1B visa admissions, will inform a discussion 
of public policies that may or may not encourage immigrant entrepreneurship.   
While I find that a considerable number of individual-level factors, such as home 
ownership and education, are correlated with an immigrant’s decision to be self-employed, it is 
not possible to establish any causal interpretation simply using an OLS regression, due to the 
endogeneity present in the model.  Similarly, it is not possible to determine the causal, state-level 
factors that make rates of immigrant entrepreneurship much higher in some states than others due 
to the endogeneity of state-level characteristics and the percentage of new businesses owned by 
immigrants.  However, the factors correlated with high rates of immigrant entrepreneurship merit 
detailed consideration.  In order to circumvent the difficulty, this study uses changes to the H-1B 
visa cap as an exogenous shock to the immigrant population in order to examine its effect on the 
immigrant share of new businesses.  The results indicate that an exogenous increase in H-1B visa 
admissions leads to a proportionally greater change in the share of immigrant-owned new 
businesses across states.  This result has substantial implications for national visa policy, which 
will be discussed further. 
The following section describes the relevant literature and current arguments regarding 
immigrant entrepreneurship, regional drivers of entrepreneurship, and immigration policy.  The 
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third section provides a descriptive analysis of the individual-level factors that are correlated 
with an immigrant’s probability of being self-employed.  The fourth section provides 
background on the H-1B visa program and estimates of the population of immigrants residing in 
the U.S. on the program.  The fifth section describes the empirical framework of the instrumental 
variables strategy and discusses the outcomes of the analysis. The sixth section details the policy 
implications of the results and the seventh section concludes the study.   
 
2 Literature Review  
Numerous branches of economic literature are related to this study.  The current literature 
that focuses on the particular contributions of immigrant entrepreneurs to the U.S. economy is 
most relevant to this study.  However, research efforts exploring the regional drivers of 
entrepreneurship, as well as the literature that addresses the impact of immigration policy on 
immigrant welfare in the workforce are highly relevant as well.  
 
2.1 Immigrant Entrepreneurship  
The literature on immigrant entrepreneurship thoroughly documents the characteristics of 
immigrant business owners and the types of businesses they own. Generally, immigrants appear 
to be more entrepreneurial than non-immigrants, meaning that the rate of business ownership is 
higher for immigrants than for non-immigrants (Fairlie 2012).  However, in George Borjas’ 1986 
study, “The Self-Employment Experience of Immigrants,” Borjas finds that assimilation, or the 
longer an immigrant has resided in the United States, increases the likelihood that an immigrant 
will be self-employed.  He also discovers that a major reason that immigrants are more likely to 
be self-employed is the existence of geographic “enclaves,” or concentrations of immigrants 
from similar national, ethnic, or language backgrounds in a geographic location.  He believes 
that informational asymmetries between immigrant enclaves and the rest of the population give 
immigrants an advantage in serving people from a similar background.  
Lofstrom (2002) also shows that though immigrants are more likely to be self-employed, 
rates vary greatly across ethnic groups.  Lofstrom finds that self-employed immigrants are also 
likelier to be more educated and have higher earnings than immigrants who work for wages or 
salaries, though they are unlikely to reach earnings parity with non-immigrants.  He calls for a 
more comprehensive investigation into the greater relative difference of earnings between self-
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employed and salaried immigrants and self-employed and salaried non-immigrants, believing 
that it is an important explanation for the higher self-employment rates of immigrants.   
In research on the types of businesses that immigrants tend to own, Fairlie (2012) finds that 
immigrant-owned firms are more likely to hire employees than native-owned firms; however, 
they tend to hire fewer employees as well.  Additionally, average sales of immigrant-owned 
firms are about 70 percent as large as the volume of sales for native-owned firms.  Furthermore, 
his study goes into depth documenting the availability of start-up capital for immigrant and non-
immigrant firms.  He discovers that the most common sources of start-up capital for both 
immigrant and non-immigrant-owned businesses are personal and family savings, though credit 
cards and bank loans are also common.  Notably, the industries in which immigrants and non-
immigrants appear to concentrate do not differ much either.  Home ownership emerges as a 
potentially important determinant of business formation as well, as it can be used as collateral to 
obtain loans.  Fairlie notes that homeowners are 10 percent more likely to start businesses, 
though he does not explicitly determine whether it is a causal relationship, and suggests that 
immigrants might have higher business ownership rates if they were as likely to own homes as 
non-immigrants.4  
In “Immigrant Entrepreneurship,” Kerr and Kerr (2016) are among few to examine the 
growth of immigrant-owned firms in the United States and express interest in the regional 
variation of immigrant entrepreneurship.  They find that immigrant-owned firms experience 
greater volatility in terms of remaining in business or failing.  While failing more frequently than 
native-owned firms, they generate greater employment if they stay in business and become 
associated with higher payroll and a greater number of establishments.  Moreover, they suspect 
that these actions emerge from differences in the ways in which immigrant entrepreneurs choose 
the locations and industries of their firms.  
 
2.2 Regional Drivers of Entrepreneurship  
A modest amount of the literature on immigrant entrepreneurship has examined regional 
variation.  In research on “High-tech Immigrant Entrepreneurship in the United States,” 
                                                
4 Further evidence on the importance of home ownership as a means of financing start-ups is 
found in Kerr, Kerr, and Nanda (2015) and Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2016). 
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Hart, Acs, and Tracy (2009) find that immigrant-founded firms tend to be located in regions with 
large immigrant populations.  Additionally, Saxenian (1999), in “Silicon Valley’s New 
Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” explores the effects of Chinese and Indian immigrant entrepreneurs 
locally on California’s Silicon Valley region and globally on China and India.  Outside of the 
literature on immigrant entrepreneurship, Reynolds, Miller and Maki (1995) attempt to explain 
the regional variation in firm “births and deaths,” for businesses across the United States.  They 
examine various state- and county-level variables in order to determine which factors drive 
entrepreneurship at the regional level.  They are unable to establish any causal links, but find that 
population growth, large personal wealth, presence of mid-career adults, and low unemployment 
have the greatest positive correlations with high rates of firm births.  In contrast, they find no 
association of R&D resources, costs of production, or access to national transportation with firm 
births.  Armington and Acs (2000) conduct a similar study on a regional level in order to explain 
the variation in firm birth rates across regions.  They find that regional differences in industry, 
income growth, unemployment rates, and human capital, such as percentage of college 
graduates, have a strong relationship with firm birth rates.   
There is still a fair amount of room for investigation into the specific drivers of 
entrepreneurship for immigrants and non-immigrants alike.  Additionally, there is reason to 
suspect that the drivers of entrepreneurship for immigrants and non-immigrants may differ 
substantially.   
 
2.3 Immigration Policy  
The body of literature examining immigration policy has resulted in interesting 
conclusions about the effect of visa programs on immigrant workers, especially in the technology 
sector.  In Jennifer Hunt’s 2009 study, “Which Immigrants are Most Innovative and 
Entrepreneurial: Distinctions by Entry Visa,” she explores the advantages of immigrants who 
entered the U.S. on a student visa or temporary work visa in areas such as wages, patenting, and 
publishing.  She finds that immigrants have an advantage over natives in the first two categories, 
but it is generally explained by their higher education and concentration in certain fields of study.  
In a more detailed 2008 study, “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation,” Hunt and 
Gaulthier-Loiselle examine the patenting behavior of immigrants relative to non-immigrants.  
Using the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates, they find that immigrants patent at double 
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the native rate, though it is entirely accounted for by their “disproportionately holding degrees in 
science and engineering.”  However, they also discover that immigrants do not crowd out natives 
in patenting, rather they create positive spill-overs that encourage natives to patent at higher rates 
as well.   
Lofstrom and Hayes (2011) specifically examine immigrants who reside in the U.S. on 
the H-1B, a temporary work visa.  They find that people on the H-1B are typically younger, more 
skilled, and higher paid in STEM fields, than native-born workers in the same occupation. Other 
studies also evaluate the impact of the workers on the H-1B, such as Kerr and Lincoln’s “The 
Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention.”  Kerr and Lincoln 
(2008) discover that fluctuations in H-1B admissions levels have a positive effect on patenting in 
cities and firms.  Like Hunt and Gaulthier-Loiselle, they also find weak crowding-in effects from 
immigrant patenting. 
 Despite these strong conclusions about visa programs, there tend to be misconceptions 
about the immediate effects of visa policy.  As Kerr and Kerr (2016) claim, many believe that 
expanding the cap for the H-1B would increase entrepreneurship, given its strong impact on 
patenting and STEM fields; however, the H-1B is temporary work visa that ties workers to their 
initial employers.  Only a green card, which is typically approved after six or more years, would 
allow temporary workers to start their own business.  While unrelated to visa policy, Lofstrom’s 
2010 study of low-skilled workers in California supports the idea that policy often does not 
effectively address immigrant entrepreneurs.  He believes that while low-skilled individuals, of 
which many are immigrants, can be successful entrepreneurs, the majority experience far lower 
earnings and success rates than those with higher skills.  Therefore, he claims that policies 
designed to encourage low-skilled immigrants to start businesses are misguided and policies to 
promote skill development are likelier to improve outcomes for low-skilled immigrants.   
 Review of each of these areas of literature reveal that there is yet much room for 
improvement and greater breadth of knowledge in these sectors.  Through integrating these 
related, though distinct, bodies of literature, this study aims to both address their shortcomings 





3 Descriptive Analysis 
 The first portion of this thesis aims to discover the individual- and state-level factors that 
influence an immigrant’s likelihood to be self-employed.  It also seeks to determine whether 
these factors affect immigrants and non-immigrants differently.  The descriptive analysis seeks 
to address the following questions: (1) what are the individual and state-level factors that make 
an immigrant or non-immigrant likely to be self employed; (2) how does the impact of these 
factors differ for immigrants and non-immigrants; and (3) what are the state-level factors that 
influence the share of immigrant-owned new businesses across states.   
 
3.1 Characteristics of Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Businesses 
  In order to conduct the descriptive analysis, it is necessary to have data on both firm and 
business-owner characteristics.  I use the 2007 and 2012 waves of the American Community 
Survey, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The survey has the advantage of a large sample 
size, and detailed information on respondents’ countries of birth, employment, age, education, 
and income.  I restrict my sample to employed, full-time workers, excluding those in the armed 
forces, who are either self-employed in incorporated businesses or work for wages.  
Additionally, I require that individuals in the sample be between the ages of 18 and 64.  The 
2007 and 2012 iterations of the ACS are selected because they correspond to the two available 
years of the Survey of Business Owners and Self-Employed Persons (SBO), also conducted by 
the U.S. Census Bureau.   
The SBO reports data at both the business and owner level, for up to four major owners.  
Various business-level statistics include sources of start-up and expansion capital, languages 
used in transactions, types and number employees used, and firms’ receipts.  Among the owner-
level statistics are, most importantly, whether or not the owner was born in the United States, the 
owner’s age, and education level.  The smallest geographic area reported for each firm in the 
SBO is the state.  I have also restricted my sample to “new businesses,” in other words, 
businesses established within five years prior to the survey.  Accordingly, the 2007 sample only 
includes only businesses founded between 2003 and 2007, while the 2012 sample includes only 
businesses founded between 2008 and 2012.  Furthermore, the firms in the sample must be non-
public, incorporated and employers.  While the data from the 2002 SBO is publicly available, it 
does not include data on owner birthplace, which I use to indicate whether an owner is an 
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immigrant.  Therefore, it is not useful for this analysis.  In both the ACS and SBO, I categorize 
immigrants as people born in a country outside of the United States.  
Table 4 compares the characteristics of the sample of self-employed individuals and 
business-owners in the SBO to self-employed individuals in the ACS.  Due to various 
inconsistencies between the ACS and SBO, it is not possible to exactly match the samples of 
self-employed individuals I create.  While the SBO provides data on self-employed individuals 
and owners of employer firms, the ACS does not distinguish between the two categories. Thus, I 
report the characteristics of the sample of SBO firms with and without self-employed 
individuals.  Within the ACS, it is also not possible to restrict the sample to owners of “new 
businesses” because there is no data on the date of the founding of an individual’s business.  
Additionally, due to the categorical nature of the age variable in the SBO, I am unable to match 
the age categories I created for use in the ACS with those existing in the SBO.   Overall, the 
samples appear relatively comparable and consistent with one another.  The similarity SBO 
sample to the ACS sample improves when self-employed individuals are included.  Roughly, 
most immigrant entrepreneurs are at a mid-career age and have greater than a high school 
education.   
 Table 5 confirms the results in Fairlie (2012), which show that immigrants are generally 
more entrepreneurial than non-immigrants in the United States.  My results also suggest that the 
percentage of immigrants who are self-employed has increased from 2007 to 2012, while the 
percentage of non-immigrants has decreased during the same time frame.   
 Table 6 describes the percentage of firms which report using various sources of start-up 
capital in the SBO.  The table compares firms with immigrant or native owners only and firms 
with mixed owners.  Mixed-ownership firms tend to be bigger than firms that are only 
immigrant- or native-owned, simply because the category requires that the firm have multiple 
owners.  Thus, a greater percentage of mixed-ownership firms report using more of each type of 
capital than the other types of firms.  The most common sources of start-up capital include 
personal savings, which approximately 70% of all types of firms report using, credit cards, bank 
loans, and home equity.  As the table shows, these sources do not differ substantially among the 
different owner categories.   
 Additional sources of data in my analysis include the County Business Patterns (CBP) 
data and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).  The CBP series provides annual data on the 
 13 
number of firms in the U.S. at both the county and industry level.  The 2007 and 2012 years of 
the CBP are used in my state-level analyses.  
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) “is intended to encourage depository 
institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate, including 
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound operations.”5  
Originally enacted in 1977, it has been revised multiple times, most recently in August 2005.  
Each “depository institution’s record” is periodically evaluated by federal supervisory agencies.  
Members of the public are also able to submit comments on the banks, which are supposedly 
taken into consideration by federal agencies.  The CRA data provides county-level estimates of 
the number and amount of small business loans each banking institution issues.  The loan data 
are organized both by the size of the loan and the revenues of the small businesses.   
 
3.2 The Determinants of Self-Employment 
 In order to address the factors that influence an individual’s likelihood to be self-
employed, I conduct an individual-level OLS regression.  Defining SEi,t as a dummy variable that 
describes whether an individual is self-employed, the model I estimate becomes:  
 !"#,% = ' + )*+#,% + ),-./0% + )1!2/2.#,% + 3#,% 
 
where Xi,t is a vector of independent variables, Year is year fixed effects, and State is state fixed 
effects.  The results of my regressions using this model are described in Table 7 which reports 
outcomes for both immigrants, in columns 1 though 6, and non-immigrants, in columns 7 
through 11.  The independent variables included in the vector Xi,t are gender, education, age, 
years that an individual has lived in the U.S. conditional on being an immigrant, whether the 
individual owns a home, the value of an individual’s home, a state-level measure of income, 
race, and a measure of the availability of small business loans at the state-level.  Gender is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether an individual is female or not.  Education is split up into 
three dummy variables that each corresponds to a particular level of education: either less than a 
high school education, high school and some college, and a bachelor’s degree or higher.  The 
                                                
5 Community Reinvestment Act. (February 11, 2014). Retrieved April 6, 2017 from 
www.federalreserve.gov/consumerscommunities/cra_about/htm 
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regressions omit less than high school education.  Similarly, age is split up into three categories: 
ages 18 to 29, 30 to 50, and 51 to 64.  The regressions omit the 18 to 29 category.   
 The state-level measure of income is a ratio of the average of self-employment income to 
the average of wage/salaried income, based on one’s status as an immigrant or non-immigrant.  
This ratio is meant to describe a factor that influences an individual’s choice to be self-employed.  
A comparison of one’s potential earnings as a self-employed person, estimated here as the 
average of self-employment earnings, with average earnings as a wage or salaried worker is 
likely to influence one’s choice of work.  Other measures of income were considered for these 
regressions, yet found to be unsuitable.  In particular, an individual’s actual income is highly 
influenced by the dependent variable, their actual work status, which makes it a poor choice.  
Another method I attempted included a ratio of an individual’s predicted earnings in both types 
of work, calculated using individual-level characteristics included in the ACS data, in the 
regressions.  However, these measures were found to be too highly correlated with other factors 
in the regressions to be useful.  
 Influenced by the start-up capital commonly reported in the SBO, I also include a dummy 
variable that describes whether a person owns a home, a variable that reports the value of an 
individual’s home, and state-level loan data.  Home value does not emerge as a useful factor for 
predicting likelihood to be self-employed because home values do not differ very much among a 
state’s immigrant or native population.  Additionally, home value is conditional on owning a 
home and, thus, reduces the sample size.  The loan variables I have included in the regressions 
are the number and value of small business loans made under the amount of $100,000, between 
$100,000 and $250,000, and between $250,000 and $1,000,000, as well as the gross number and 
value of loans made to businesses that report less than $1,000,000 in revenue.  These variables 
are scaled by the state population.  Estimates using different combinations of these variables are 
reported in columns 3 through 6 of Table 7.  The results appear to be robust to different 
combinations of these loans.   
 Women are globally underrepresented in self-employment, especially among owners of 
employer firms.  The first row in Table 7 illustrates that being female is consistently associated 
with a decrease in the likelihood of being self-employed for both immigrants and non-
immigrants.  This decrease is stronger for non-immigrants than it is for immigrants. Various 
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studies have suggested differing risk attitudes between women and men, the likelihood of getting 
funding for women, and overconfidence in men as potential factors that explain the difference.   
 Notably, a high school education is associated with a significant increase in the likelihood 
of being self-employed for immigrants, but a significant decrease in likelihood for natives.  
Additionally, a college degree is associated with an insignificant decrease in the likelihood of 
being self-employed for immigrants, and a small, but significant decrease in likelihood for 
natives.  It is possible that as natives becomes more highly educated, they see their prospects for 
wage employment increase and therefore choose employment over self-employment, while 
immigrants do not see the same increase in their employment prospects.  There are a few factors 
that may explain the difference.  Mainly, discrimination in the workplace is likely to limit 
immigrants’ opportunities, or deter them from pursuing employment.  There is also some 
research to suggest that an immigrant’s level of education does not matter as much to employers 
as the country in which an immigrant received his or her education.  Employers may be biased 
against, or skeptical, of education received outside of the U.S.   
 Age has a significant, positive correlation of a similar size for both immigrants and non-
immigrants.  As they age, both immigrants and non-immigrants are more likely to be self-
employed.  A higher number of years spent in the U.S. is also correlated with a higher 
probability of being self-employed for immigrants, although the effect is small.  Immigrants may 
see the resources available to them for self-employment improve with time.  Owning a home also 
has a significant positive correlation with the probability of self-employment for immigrants and 
non-immigrants, though the effect is higher for immigrants.  This may indicate a greater 
eligibility for home equity or bank loans, which are common sources of start-up capital for both 
groups.   
The income ratio has an insignificant negative correlation with self-employment for 
immigrants and an insignificant positive correlation for natives.  I would expect the correlation to 
be positive in both cases, as it would indicate higher potential earnings to self-employment.  Yet, 
the insignificance of both coefficients suggests that the measure may simply be imprecise.  
However, a t-test reports that mean self-employment income is significantly larger than mean 
salaried income for immigrants and natives.  In future research, it would be worthwhile to 
explore the relationship between potential earnings and immigrant self-employment outcomes in 
more depth.  The outcomes of the regressions with the loan data included show that the 
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availability of small loans under $100,000 and the gross number of small business loans have a 
significant, positive correlation with both immigrants’ and natives’ likelihoods of being self-
employed.  
 The results of these regressions provide substantial insight into the population of 
immigrant entrepreneurs in the U.S.  A better understanding of immigrant entrepreneurs may 
generate understanding to how one might generate incentives to increase entrepreneurship.  
While these results have great descriptive power, the correlations cannot be interpreted in a 
causal manner.  The model suffers from endogeneity, due to the potential for the dependent 
variable to affect the independent variables.  For example, in addition to the likelihood that 
someone who owns a home has a higher probability of being self-employed, it is also possible 
that the fact that an individual is self-employed makes her more likely to own a home.  However, 
these results remain vital to our understanding of the population of immigrants, as well as non-
immigrant entrepreneurs in the U.S.  
 
3.3 State-Level Determinants of Immigrant Entrepreneurship 
In addition, this paper aims to determine the spatial, or state-level, factors that lead to the 
vast differences in the rates of immigrant entrepreneurship across states.  As Tables 1 and 2 
illustrate, both rates of immigrant entrepreneurship and the growth rates of immigrant 
entrepreneurship from 2007 to 2012 vary greatly across states.  Previous literature confirms that 
much of the differences across states is correlated with the differences in the immigrant 
percentage of the state population.  Hart et al. (2009) find that immigrant founded firms tend to 
be located in states with large immigrant populations.  A comparison of Tables 1 and 3 
emphasizes this point well.  While it is intuitive that this correlation exists, and later results will 
confirm the relationship, it is unlikely that the mere percentage of immigrants in a state accounts 
for all the variation, given the vast differences among immigrant populations across states.   
 In order to test the relationship between the state shares of immigrant entrepreneurship 
and the immigrant share of the state population, as well as other state-level factors and 
characteristics of the immigrant population, I choose to run an OLS regression.  Defining 
IMBUSs,t as the percentage of immigrant-owned new businesses in a state, calculated using the 
2007 and 2012 iterations of the SBO, the model I estimate becomes:  
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where IMPOPs,t is the percentage of the total population that are immigrants, Xs,t is a vector of 
controls, and Year is year fixed effects.  The results of this regression are located in Table 8.  The 
state-level controls contained in Xs,t include the percentage of immigrants who own a home, the 
percentages of immigrants with the earlier-described levels of education, the percentages of 
immigrants within the earlier-described age categories, and a variable I have called MHHI, 
which measures a state’s concentration in any particular type of industry.  Earlier studies, such as 
Armington and Acs (2000), reflect the strong impact of a state’s industry composition on the rate 
at which new firms are created.  One could imagine that a state heavily concentrated in an 
industry with high barriers to entry would lead to fewer firm births, for example.  The initial 
measure of industry concentration I considered was an indicator for the industry with the greatest 
number of establishments in a state.  However, this proved to be ineffective because the industry 
with the greatest number of establishments in almost every state is retail, according to the CBP.  
Therefore, I create a modified Herfindahl-Hirshman index to describe a state’s industry 
composition.  
A Herfindahl-Hirshman Index, HHI, is a common measure of market concentration.  
Typically, one calculates it by “squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market 
and then summing the resulting number.”6  This measure is commonly used in anti-trust or 
merger evaluations.  While using an actual HHI for each industry in a state may have been 
useful, data constraints prevented me from doing so.  Therefore, I calculate a modified version of 
the HHI, which I call MHHI:  
 
5;;48 = < =>?@.0<AB<"C2/@DECℎ?.G2C8#HA2/D<=>?@.0<AB<"C2/@DECℎ?.G2C8 ∗ 100 ,L#M*  
 
                                                
6 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. (July 29, 2015). Retrieved April 7, 2017 from 
www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index  
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where s is the state and i is the industry.  MHHI is a helpful state-level measure of the 
concentration of a state’s establishments in any industry.  The data used to create this variable 
come from the CBP data described earlier.   
 Table 8 finds a large, significant correlation between the immigrant percentage of the 
state population and the immigrant share of new businesses.  The answer is relatively intuitive, 
as a high percentage of immigrants in a population would certainly imply more new businesses 
being owned by immigrants.  However, it is interesting to note that the coefficient on the 
immigrant percentage of the population is greater than 1, meaning that for a given increase in the 
immigrant population in a state, the implied increase in the immigrant share of new businesses is 
proportionally larger.  
 Also significant at the 1-percent level is the coefficient on the percentage of the 
immigrant population with a Bachelor’s degree or higher.  A higher percentage of immigrants 
with a college degree is correlated with higher percentages of immigrant-owned new businesses. 
In contrast, the individual-level analysis shows that having a college degree is not significantly 
correlated with increased likelihood of being an entrepreneur.  Additionally, an immigrant 
population with a higher percentage of high school graduates is negatively, though 
insignificantly, correlated with the share of immigrant-owned new businesses at the state-level.  
At the individual level, the correlation between a high school degree and likelihood of being an 
immigrant is positive.   
 My earlier results showed that owning a home was associated with an increased 
likelihood of being self-employed; however, the state-level outcomes reveal that higher 
percentages of immigrant home ownership are correlated with lower percentages of immigrant-
owned new businesses.  The unexpected differences between the coefficients on education and 
home ownership may be explained by the possibility that more low-skilled immigrants gather in 
areas with a high-skilled population.  For example, Cortez and Tessada (2011) find that low-
skilled immigrants increase their hours of work when the supply of high-skilled women 
increases, due to demand for services.  Similarly, a highly-educated immigrant population may 
demand more services, leading to opportunities for low-skilled immigrants who will gather in the 
same area.    
 Age remains consistently, positively correlated with the immigrant share of new 
businesses; however, the outcomes for both categories are insignificant.  Additionally, the 
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coefficient on MHHI was negative and insignificant.  A negative correlation implies that a higher 
concentration of a state in any particular industry leads to less immigrant entrepreneurship.  
 While running a state-level OLS regression is useful for beginning the empirical analysis, 
it does not produce the causal estimates required for making policy conclusions.  By definition, 
using the 2007 and 2012 SBO data to run a state-level analysis limits the available number of 
observations.  As mentioned previously, it is not possible to extend this analysis beyond two 
years because the 2002 wave of the SBO does not include data on owners’ birthplaces.  This 
state-level OLS model may be subject to endogeneity similar to that of the individual-level OLS 
model.  In this case, it is not possible to know whether the characteristics of the immigrants 
contribute to the variation in shares of immigrant-owned new businesses across states or, 
conversely, whether immigrants with such characteristics are attracted to those states because of 
the high number of immigrant-owned firms which exist there.   
 One way to resolve the endogeneity that is present here is to create a model that 
incorporates instrumental variables.  In order to estimate the impact of the state-level population 
of immigrants on the percentage of immigrant-owned new businesses without the problems 
posed by endogeneity, I require a source of exogenous variation in the immigrant population.  I 
propose the national admissions of immigrant workers on the H-1B visa as a source of 
exogenous variation in the immigrant population.  While I am unable to obtain actual values of 
the national population of immigrants residing in the U.S. on the H-1B, I am able to obtain 
estimates of these values.  This, interacted with the state-level “dependency” on immigrant 
workers serves as my instrument.  The following chapters will describe the H-1B program in 
more detail and the empirical methods that incorporate these instruments.    
 
4 The H-1B Visa Program 
 The H-1B is the major visa category in the U.S. that allows immigrant workers to enter 
the U.S. temporarily under the sponsorship of a U.S. employer.  The H-1B visa program allows 
U.S. employers to apply for temporary assistance from skilled, foreign workers in “specialty 
occupations.”  A specialty occupation is generally characterized as “so complex or unique that it 
can be performed only by an individual with a degree.”7  Thus, approximately 99% of all H-1B 
                                                
7H-1B Specialty Occupations, DOD Cooperative Research and Development Project Workers, 
and Fashion Models. (April 4, 2017). Retrieved April 17, 2017 from 
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visa-holders have a bachelor’s degree or higher level of education.  In 2012, the most widely 
listed specialty occupation on approved H-1B petitions by U.S. employers was “computer-
related occupations.”8   Table 10 illustrates the distribution of approved applications by specialty 
occupation in 2001 and 2006.  
Each visa is valid for a term of three years, which an employer can request to extend for a 
second, additional term of 3 years. Thus, the maximum length of time an individual can reside in 
the U.S. on the H-1B is six years.  During these terms, a worker is tied to the employer that 
sponsors the visa.  An employer can also apply for permanent residency on behalf of the worker.  
Permanent residency is usually requested in the form of a “green card.”  While there is public 
data on green card approvals, there is little data on rates of transition from H-1B temporary 
residency to permanent residency, as well as most forms of transition from temporary to 
permanent residency.   
All employers are required to submit a Labor Condition Application (LCA) to the U.S. 
Department of Labor to obtain an H-1B visa for foreign labor.  LCA’s are required to ensure that 
employers are acting in accordance with U.S. law, with regard to requirements that foreign 
workers receive the prevailing wage for their labor and satisfactory working conditions.  These 
applications provide an important source of data in my later analysis.  There are few good 
substitutes to the H-1B, which makes it a widely-used program and source of foreign labor for 
the U.S.   
 The Immigration Act of 1990 established an annual cap on the number of H-1B visas, 
with an exemption for renewals.  There is no cap on the number that can be issued for residents 
of any particular country, though a few free trade agreements require that a certain number of 
visas be reserved for citizens of a few countries.  Most H-1B beneficiaries come from India and 
China, 64.1% and 7.6% respectively in 2012.  Recipients from other countries each generally 
make up less than 3% of beneficiaries annually.  Table 9 describes these countries in greater 
detail.   




8 Reports and Studies. (February 2, 2017). Retrieved April 17, 2017 from 
https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/reports-and-studies!
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The annual cap on H-1B admissions fluctuated significantly from 1990 to 2012.  Figure 
4, adapted and expanded from Kerr and Lowell (2010), illustrates the annual fluctuations in the 
H-1B cap over time.  Additionally, the figure shows the total number of H-1B issuances, which 
tend to hover around the cap until 2002.  The bursting of the “tech bubble” in 2001 led to 
decreased demand for workers in the tech sector, which implied decreased demand for foreign 
workers as well.  In 2001, universities, government research labs, and various nonprofit 
organizations became exempt from the cap; however, demand for foreign labor had not yet 
recovered.  In 2004, the H-1B cap was reduced to 65,000, with an additional 20,000 visas 
allotted for foreign workers with Master’s degrees or higher.  Once demand for foreign workers 
returned, around the time when the cap was decreased, the various exemptions led the total 
number of H-1B issuances above the cap.  Since 2004, no further changes have been made to the 
cap, though President Obama proposed a sharp increase to the cap during his second term in 
office.9  It is essential to note that in order to use H-1B admissions as a successful instrument, 
changes to the cap must be exogenous.  At the state-level, where the analysis takes place, it is 
indeed quite reasonable to assume that individual states cannot effect changes to the H-1B cap.   
 Despite the comprehensive data available on the number of H-1B visas issued annually, 
the actual population of H-1B beneficiaries working in the U.S. at a given time is unknown.  
However, Lowell (2000) is able to build a model that estimates the population for the years 1990 
to 2008.  He uses the “known” H-1B inflows and models the outflows, which consist of 
emigration, death, and transitions to permanent residency.  The population estimates are also 
included in Figure 4.  Lowell’s contribution is essential to this study, as the national population 
of H-1B beneficiaries is necessary to construct the instruments in my analysis.   
 
5 Spatial Analysis of the H-1B Visa Program  
5.1 Empirical Strategy 
This analysis seeks to explain how U.S. visa policy, particularly with respect to the H-1B, 
impacts rates of immigrant entrepreneurship across states.  The empirical framework of this 
                                                
9 H1B Visa Total Cap Stats from FY 1990 to 2018, Trend Plot until 2018. (March 11, 2017).  




model estimates the impact of national H-1B admissions on the percentage of immigrant-owned 
new businesses across states.  As previously explained, the endogeneity present in the original 
state-level OLS model makes it necessary to approach this question using instrumental variables.  
My method is adapted from Kerr and Lincoln (2010) who use similar instruments in a reduced-
form model to estimate the change in H-1B admissions on employment in science and 
engineering.  I exploit the significant variation in rates of immigrant entrepreneurship across 
states to examine how an exogenous shock to the national immigrant population affects a state’s 
share of immigrant-owned new businesses.   
I estimate the first-stage relationship between the immigrant percentage of each state’s 
population, IMPOPst, and the instrumental variable, IVst, according to:  
 459:98% = ' + )*4N8% + ),+8% + )1-./0% + 38% 
 
where Xst is a vector of demographic controls, including rates of home ownership, education, 
age, and MHHI, used in the initial state-level model, and Year is year fixed effects. 
 The second-stage regression measures the impact of the immigrant percentage of the 
population, IMPOPst, estimated using the instrumental variable, on the percentage of immigrant-
owned new businesses, IMBUSst:  
 4567!8% = ' + )*459:98% + ),+8% + )1-./0% + 38% 
 
where Xst is the earlier described vector of demographic controls, and Year is year fixed effects.  
Using instrumental variables requires certain assumptions for β1 to properly identify the effects 
of the independent variable on rates of immigrant entrepreneurship.  First, changes to the H-1B 
cap and, thus, the quantity of national H-1B admissions must be determined exogenously.  In this 
study, it is safe to assume that individual states do not have the ability to impact the national cap 
on issuances of H-1B visas.  Second, the instrument, IVst, must be correlated with the immigrant 
percentage of the population and have different impacts across states.  This assumption can be 
verified using existing data.  Third, the instrument must be uncorrelated with any of the 
unobserved determinants of the states’ shares of immigrant entrepreneurship.   
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 Ideally, the instrument I use would describe the impact of H-1B admissions on the 
immigrant population of each state, i.e. the stock of H-1B immigrants in a state in a given time; 
however, as noted earlier, it is not possible to know this measure exactly.  I estimate this measure 
by interacting the exogenous changes to the national population of H-1B workers with a measure 
of each state’s “dependency” on H-1B workers.  Each instrument is generally constructed as: 
 4N8% = ;16OAO%PQ ∗ 45R.O8,%PQ 
 
where H1Bpopt-6 is the lagged measure of the national population of H-1B workers and IMDeps,t-
6 is the lagged measure of immigrant dependency.  In each of my instrumental variables, 
Lowell’s national estimates of the H-1B population serve as H1Bpopt-6.  I use two measures of a 
state’s initial dependency on immigrants, IMDeps,t-6. 
 The first measure is generated from annual data published by the Department of Labor on 
Labor Condition Applications (LCAs).  I aggregate the number of foreign workers requested in 
LCAs per state.  Essentially, the number of workers requested in the LCAs represents each 
state’s demand for H-1B workers, which makes it an apt measure of state dependency.  I 
normalize each state’s demand for workers by the total state population.  The instrument that 
interacts Lowell’s estimates of the national H-1B population and the LCA measure of 
dependency is constructed as:  
 STU4N8% = ln<(SAY.DD%PQ) ∗ UOOC8,%PQ!2/2.9AO8,%PQ  
 
where Lowells,t-6 is the lagged estimate of the national population of H-1B workers, Appss,t-6 is 
the lagged number of H-1B workers requested for a particular state in LCAs in a given year, and 
StatePops,t-6 is the lagged total state population.  Table 11 describes most and least dependent 
states on the H-1B program, using the LCA measure of dependency.   
 Due to the nature of the H-1B, the Lowell estimates and ACS dependencies used in this 
model must be lagged by at least 6 years.   Foreign workers on the H-1B are tied for their 
sponsoring firm for a minimum of 3 years and thus, unable to start a firm immediately upon 
arriving.  Most H-1B workers begin a second 3-year term with their initial employer before 
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obtaining a green card.  Moreover, individuals from nationalities that are highly represented in 
the H-1B program, especially those from China and India, face between 5 and 10 year wait times 
for green cards.10  The ideal lag time, according to this information, would be between longer 
than 6 years; however, the Lowell estimates and LCA data have a limited number of available 
years.  A lag of 6 years is the most accurate amount of time given the data constraints.   
 My second measure of state dependency is derived from the ACS data described earlier.  
As Table 9 illustrates, the vast majority of H-1B workers come from China and India.  Thus, a 
reasonable measure of a state’s dependency is the share of Chinese and Indian immigrants as a 
percentage of the state population.  The instrument that interacts the H-1B admissions and ACS 
measure of dependency is constructed as:  
 UT!4N8% = ln<(SAY.DD%PQ) ∗ (T;[5H!8,%PQ + 4968,%PQ) 
 
where CHKMTSs,t-6 is the share of immigrants from China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and 
Singapore, lagged by 6 years, and IPBs,t-6 is the share of immigrants from India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh, lagged by 6 years.  The states which are most and least dependent on the H-1B 
program, as measured using the ACS, are listed in Table 12.  Using two different measures of 
immigrant dependency to generate two different instruments serves as a test of the robustness of 
this model.   
 
5.2 LCA Outcomes  
Using the LCA instrument, I estimate the first-stage impact of H-1B admissions on the 
state-level share of immigrant-owned new businesses according to the equation below:  
 459:98% = ' + )*STU4N8% + ),+8% + )1-./0% + 38% 
 
The results of the first-stage, presented in Table 13, show that my estimate of the stock of H-1B 
workers in each state is predictive of the immigrant share of each state’s population.  In the 
presence of various state-level controls, a 1 percentage-point increase in the national population 
                                                
10 Wait times also depend largely on the category under which the individual applies for the 
green card.  Such information is not available in the SBO or ACS.  
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of H-1B workers, scaled by the state dependency, leads to a 0.00223 percentage-point increase in 
the immigrant share of the population.  While the effect is small in magnitude, it is significant at 
the 1 percent level.  The positive value also suggests that an increase in my estimate of the stock 
of H-1B workers in a particular state does result in an increase in the immigrant percentage of 
the state population.  The F-statistic in the first-stage is 12.716.  The first-stage relationship is 
plotted in Figures 5 and 6.  These graphs verify the relationship between the instrument and the 
immigrant percentage of the population.   
 I estimate the impact of a state’s immigrant population, as predicted by my instrument, on 
the state-level immigrant share of new businesses according to the second-stage regression 
below:  
 4567!8% = ' + )*459:98% + ),+8% + )1-./0% + 38% 
 
The results of the second-stage are presented in Column 3 of Table 14.  The coefficient reports 
that a 1 percentage-point increase in the immigrant share of the population, as predicted by the 
LCA instrument, leads to a 1.346 percentage-point increase in the immigrant share of new 
businesses in a state.  Hart et al. (2009) claim that the immigrant percentage of the state 
population is highly predictive of the state-level share of immigrant entrepreneurship.  I have 
shown that this relationship is somewhat causal and that the effect is greater than 1.  A given 
percentage-point increase in the state-level share of immigrants leads to an even greater increase 
in the share of immigrant entrepreneurship.  As Figures 1 and 3 and Tables 1 and 3 reinforce, the 
share of immigrant entrepreneurship in each state is consistently higher than the immigrant share 
of a state’s population.  These findings indicate that an exogenous increase in the stock of H-1B 
workers does appear to increase rates of immigrant entrepreneurship across states.  Thus, states 
can expect a differential, positive increase in the share of immigrant entrepreneurship, based on 
their dependency on H-1B workers, if the national cap on admissions of H-1B workers is 
increased.   
It is useful to compare the results of the IV model with those of the original state-level 
model.  These results are presented side-by-side for comparison in Table 14.  It is clear that the 
effect of the immigrant share of the population on immigrant entrepreneurship is larger when I 
instrument for the immigrant population.   
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 While the LCA data provides a reliable estimate of the demand for foreign workers 
within a state, the relationship between the LCA instrument and the state-level immigrant 
percentage of the population was not very large.  Moreover, there is a small amount of 
measurement error that occurs when using the LCA data because it is calculated by fiscal year, 
as opposed to the actual year.  Therefore, it seems useful to test an additional measure of state 
dependency, using the ACS state-level shares of immigrants from China, Hong Kong, Macau, 
Taiwan, Singapore, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.   
 
5.3 ACS Outcomes  
Using the ACS instrument as described earlier, I estimate the first-stage impact of H-1B 
admissions on the state-level share of immigrant-owned new businesses according to the 
equation below:  
 9AO9\28% = ' + )*UT!4N8% + ),+8% + 38% 
 
The results of the first-stage model presented in Table 13 show that a 1 percentage-point increase 
in the national population of H-1B workers, scaled by the state dependency, results in a 0.537 
percentage point increase in the immigrant share of the state population.  The effect of the ACS 
instrument on the immigrant share of the population is much larger in magnitude than that of the 
LCA instrument; though both have significant effects.  The fact that the coefficient is positive 
reinforces the positive relationship between the national population of H-1B workers and the 
state-level immigrant populations.  The F-statistic for the first-stage is quite large at 198.099.  
The size of the F-statistic in this regression, indicates that the ACS instrument may be preferable 
to the LCA instrument.  
 In the second-stage regression, I estimate the effect of the immigrant percentage of the 
population, calculated using the ACS instrument, on the state-level share of immigrant 
entrepreneurship, according to the model below:  
 4567!8% = ' + )*459:98% + ),+8% + )1-./0% + 38% 
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The results of the second-stage, presented in Column 3 of Table 14, report that a 1 percentage-
point increase in the immigrant percentage of the population, calculated using the ACS 
instrument, leads to a 1.346 percentage-point increase in the immigrant share of new businesses 
in a state.  This model should be compared with both the original state-level model and the 
model that uses the LCA instrument in Column 2 of Table 14.  Much like the results that I find 
using the LCA instrument, the outcomes of this model indicate that there is a positive, causal 
relationship between the immigrant percentage of the population, when instrument, and the share 
of immigrant entrepreneurship in a state.  The size of the effect, which is greater than 1, is also 
consistent with the estimates that result from the LCA model; however, both the first- and 
second-stage results of the ACS model are stronger than those of the LCA model.  The stronger 
effects in both stages of the ACS model, as well as the large F-statistic of the instrument in the 
first-stage, lead me to prefer the ACS instrument to the LCA instrument.   
 The general interpretation of these results is the same: an exogenous increase in the 
national cap on admissions of H-1B workers will lead to a differential, positive impact on the 
share of immigrant entrepreneurship across states.  The policy implications of this result are 
discussed in the following section.   
 
6 Policy Outcomes 
 As my research and prior literature has shown, immigrants play a significant role in 
entrepreneurship in the U.S.  My results quantify this relationship and indicate that exogenous 
increases in the national stock of H-1B workers lead to increased rates of immigrant 
entrepreneurship across states.  States can expect to see differential positive increases in the 
share of immigrant entrepreneurship, based on their dependency on H-1B workers, if the national 
cap on admissions of H-1B workers is increased.  Considering the substantial impact that 
immigrants have on rates of entrepreneurship, it is imperative to consider the implications of the 
H-1B visa policy on entrepreneurship in the U.S.   
  Recently, economists have begun to speculate that the productivity slowdown in the 
United States, which has been present since the 2008 recession, has something to do with the 
slowing rates of new business formation.  Janet Yellen, Chair of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, stated in a 2017 speech that  
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“Economists do not fully understand the causes of the productivity slowdown. Some 
emphasize that technological progress and its diffusion throughout the economy seem to 
be slower over the past decade or so... And still others focus on a dramatic slowing in the 
creation of new businesses, which are often more innovative than established firms. 
While each of these factors has likely played a role in slowing productivity growth, the 
extent to which they will continue to do so is an open question.”11 
While Figure 2 shows that different states have experienced both positive and negative changes 
to rates of immigrant entrepreneurship between 2007 and 2012, the national rate of 
entrepreneurship has declined over time.  Judging by my findings, visa policy has significant 
implications for rates of entrepreneurship.  When deliberating about shaping future rates of 
productivity and output growth the U.S., it would be worthwhile to consider how opening up visa 
policy and other immigration categories could benefit long-run growth.  Addressing Yellen’s 
comments about the impact of “technological progress,” others have shown that the H-1B and 
student visa categories have positive impacts on technological progress as well.  Kerr and 
Lincoln (2010) show that raising the cap on H-1B admissions increases immigrant employment 
in science and engineering, as well as patenting.  Hunt and Gaulthier-Loiselle (2008) also find a 
positive impact of immigration on immigrant patenting, as well as positive spillover effects for 
native patenting.   
 The U.S.’s current policies on immigration have been a source of confusion and dismay 
for many in recent months.  Under President Trump, whose recent executive orders on 
immigration have substantially tightened policy, it seems that the prospects for increasing 
immigrant entrepreneurship in the U.S. are low.  Not only could the tightening of immigration 
policy have detrimental effects on entrepreneurship in the U.S., but the atmosphere of hostility 
toward immigrants that President Trump’s election has intensified could result in lower 
immigrant demand to enter the U.S.  While it may not be possible to see the effects of more 
stringent immigration policy and hostility toward immigrants in the near future, the long-run 
prospects do not seem entirely positive, considering my results.  
 In order to consider the full impact of H-1B visa policy, one must weigh the potential 
benefits against the potential costs.  President Trump has vacillated between stating that the H-
                                                
11 The Goals of Monetary Policy and How We Pursue Them. (January 18, 2017). Retrieved April 
17, 2017 from https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20170118a.htm 
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1B program should be eliminated entirely, calling it “unfair to workers,”12 and conversely 
claiming that it should be kept.  Other critics of the H-1B program,13 who have conducted 
research into its functions, claim, rather, that it needs “a substantial overhaul,” citing low wage 
requirements and deficient program oversight and enforcement, and that H-1B workers can be 
easily exploited because employers hold the visa rather than the workers.  There is also evidence 
that a few outsourcing companies obtain a substantial portion of the available H-1B visas 
annually, crowding out smaller American companies who could benefit from foreign workers.14  
Such critiques of the program must not be disregarded.   
 While my results indicate that we must incorporate visa policy into our discussions of 
technological progress, productivity growth, and especially entrepreneurship, it is especially 
necessary to consider how the U.S. can reform its visa programs to better suit the welfare of 
immigrants.   
 
7 Conclusion 
Immigrants have a substantial role in determining rates of entrepreneurship across states.   
Recent concerns over the declining national rates of business formation in the U.S. make 
learning about immigrant entrepreneurs in the U.S. of great importance.  My study has examined 
numerous individual- and state-level factors that are correlated with increased likelihood of being 
self-employed and compared these for immigrants and natives.  I have also collected various 
state-level factors that are associated with increased rates of immigrant entrepreneurship across 
states.  I also conducted an analysis to determine the effect of H-1B visa policy on shares of 
immigrant entrepreneurship across states.  My findings indicate that exogenous increases in the 
national stock of H-1B workers lead to increased rates of immigrant entrepreneurship.  In other 
                                                
12 Trump, Rubio hit Disney over H-1B visa usage. (March 11, 2016). Retrieved April 17, 2017 
from http://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2016/03/11/republican-debate-miami-trump-rubio-
disney-h1b-visa-2.cnn/video/playlists/2016-republican-presidential-debates/ 
13 The H-1B and L1 Visa Programs: Out of Control. (October 14, 2010). Retrieved from 
http://globalworkers.org/sites/default/files/visafiles/R%20Hira%20EPI%20L-
1%20paper%202.pdf.!!
14 How Outsourcing Companies Are Gaming the Visa System. (November 10, 2015). Retrieved 




words, based on a state’s dependency on H-1B workers, an increase to the national cap on 
admissions of H-1B workers will differentially increase shares immigrant-owned new 
businesses.  
My study raises certain questions and considerations that I hope future research will 
endeavor to address.  While my study documents many of the determinants of immigrant 
entrepreneurship in the U.S., I believe there remains much more to learn about the national 
population of immigrant entrepreneurs.  There is room to discover how the U.S. can incentivize 
immigrant entrepreneurship across states.  As I have noted, income for self-employed 
immigrants is greater than that of other immigrants.  While this may be the result of sorting into 
the optimal profession, higher rates of entrepreneurship could benefit the immigrant population.  
In addition, it would be worthwhile to consider the effects of additional visa or permanent 
residency categories on immigrant entrepreneurship.  National visa policy, particularly with 
regard to the H-1B, has considerable potential to determine future rates of immigrant 
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9 Appendix: Figures and Tables  
 
Figure 1: Geographic Heat Map of the Immigrant Share of New Businesses (2007) 
 
Note: Darker shades represent higher percentages of immigrant-owned new businesses.  The 
immigrant shares of new businesses are calculated using the 2007 Survey of Business Owners 
and Self-Employed Persons (SBO).  The sample includes incorporated, non-public, employer 
firms founded from 2003 to 2007 and for which data is available on the birthplace(s) of the 
owner(s).  Details on the percentage of immigrant-owned new businesses in each state are found 




Figure 2: Geographic Heat Map of the Change in the Immigrant Share of New Businesses from 
2007 to 2012 
 
Note: Red-colored states experienced decreases in the percentage of immigrant-owned new 
businesses from 2007 to 2012.  Green-colored states experienced increases in the percentage of 
immigrant-owned new businesses during the same time frame.  The immigrant shares of new 
businesses are calculated using the 2007 and 2012 SBO.  The samples include incorporated, non-
public, employer firms founded within five years of the SBO and for which data is available on 
the birthplace(s) of the owner(s).  Details on the changes in the shares of immigrant-owned new 




Figure 3: Geographic Heat Map of the Immigrant Percentage of the Population (2007) 
 
Note: Darker shades represent larger immigrant populations.  The immigrant percentages of the 
state populations are calculated using the 2007 American Community Survey (ACS).  The 
sample includes all people for whom data on birthplace is available.  Details on the immigrant 
percentage of the population in each state are found in Table 3.   
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Figure 4: Annual H-1B Population Estimates (Lowell, 2001), Admissions Caps, and Admissions 
 
Note: This graph displays estimates of the annual population of H-1B beneficiaries in the U.S., 
provided by Lowell (2001) up to the year 2008, the annual cap on H-1B visas, and the annual 
number of issuances of H-1B visas to foreign workers.   




Figure 5: First-Stage Relationship between the Immigrant Percentage of the State Population 
(2007) and the LCA instrument (2007) 
 
Note: This table plots the immigrant percentage of each state’s population in 2007, calculated 
using the 2007 ACS, against the Labor Conditional Application (LCA) instrument for 2007.  
Each state is represented on the graph as its abbreviated name.  Table 13 reports the correlation 
between these variables.   
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Figure 6: First-Stage Relationship between the Immigrant Percentage of the State Population 
(2012) and the LCA instrument (2012) 
 
Note: This table plots the immigrant percentage of each state’s population in 2012, calculated 
using the 2012 ACS, against the Labor Conditional Application (LCA) instrument for 2012.  
Each state is represented on the graph as its abbreviated name.  Table 13 reports the correlation 
between these variables.   
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Figure 7: First-Stage Relationship between the Immigrant Percentage of the State Population 
(2007) and the ACS instrument (2007) 
 
Note: This table plots the immigrant percentage of each state’s population in 2007, calculated 
using the 2012 ACS, against the ACS instrument for 2007.  Each state is represented on the 
graph as its abbreviated name.  Table 13 reports the correlation between these variables.   
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Figure 7: First-Stage Relationship between the Immigrant Percentage of the State Population 
(2012) and the ACS instrument (2012) 
 
Note: This table plots the immigrant percentage of each state’s population in 2012, calculated 
using the 2012 ACS, against the ACS instrument for 2012.  Each state is represented on the 





      
Table 1: States with the Highest and Lowest Shares of Immigrant-Owned New 
Businesses 
  State 2007   State 2012 
1 California 42.9%  New Jersey 44.4% 
2 New York 40.5%  New York 43.2% 
3 New Jersey 39.5%  California 42.0% 
4 Florida 30.7%  Florida 32.9% 
5 Delaware 29.1%  District of Columbia 32.2% 
6 District of Columbia 29.1%  Illinois 31.6% 
7 Connecticut 28.9%  Massachusetts 30.3% 
8 Illinois 28.0%  Maryland 30.2% 
9 Maryland 28.0%  Texas 30.0% 
10 Massachusetts 26.8%  Tennessee 30.0% 
…      
42 Maine 9.1%  Nebraska 8.0% 
43 Kentucky 9.0%  Utah 7.6% 
44 Arkansas 9.0%  Wyoming 6.8% 
45 Iowa 8.6%  Maine 6.7% 
46 Idaho 7.5%  West Virginia 6.3% 
47 Nebraska 6.7%  Iowa 6.1% 
48 North Dakota 6.1%  Montana 5.5% 
49 South Dakota 6.1%  Idaho 4.7% 
50 Montana 5.0%  North Dakota 4.7% 
51 West Virginia 4.9%   South Dakota 2.4% 
Note: This table reports states with the highest and lowest percentages of immigrant-
owned new businesses in 2007 and 2012.  The 2007 and 2012 SBO samples include 
incorporated, non-public, employer firms, founded from 2003 to 2007.   
!
   
Table 2: States with the Largest and Smallest Changes in 
the Share of Immigrant-Owned New Businesses from 
2007 to 2012 
  State Percent Change 
1 Tennessee 16.6% 
2 Texas 5.5% 
3 Alabama 5.3% 
4 New Jersey 4.9% 
5 Hawaii 4.0% 
6 Ohio 3.9% 
7 Mississippi 3.6% 
8 Alaska 3.6% 
9 Illinois 3.6% 
10 Massachusetts 3.5% 
…   
42 Arizona -1.2% 
43 North Dakota -1.4% 
44 Utah -2.1% 
45 Maine -2.4% 
46 Iowa -2.5% 
47 Idaho -2.8% 
48 Wyoming -3.2% 
49 South Dakota -3.7% 
50 New Mexico -4.8% 
51 Delaware -6.2% 
Note: This table reports the states with the largest and 
smallest changes in the share of immigrant-owned new 
businesses between 2007 and 2012.  The SBO sample 
used to calculate these changes includes incorporated, 
non-public, employers, founded from 2003 to 2007 in 
the 2007 SBO and 2008 to 2012 in the 2012 SBO.   
!
      
Table 3: States with the Largest and Smallest Immigrant Populations  
  State 2007   State 2012 
1 California 28.0%  California 28.1% 
2 New York 22.1%  New York 23.2% 
3 New Jersey 20.4%  New Jersey 22.0% 
4 Florida 19.7%  Florida 20.6% 
5 Nevada 19.6%  Nevada 20.3% 
6 Hawaii 18.4%  Hawaii 19.5% 
7 Texas 16.7%  Texas 17.3% 
8 Arizona 16.0%  Massachusetts 15.8% 
9 Massachusetts 14.9%  
District of 
Columbia 15.2% 
10 Illinois 14.1%  Maryland 15.0% 
…      
42 Missouri 4.0%  Maine 4.3% 
43 Louisiana 3.6%  Louisiana 4.2% 
44 Wyoming 3.5%  Alabama 4.2% 
45 Alabama 3.3%  Kentucky 3.8% 
46 Kentucky 3.2%  Wyoming 3.8% 
47 North Dakota 3.1%  North Dakota 3.3% 
48 South Dakota 2.8%  South Dakota 3.3% 
49 Montana 2.6%  Montana 2.6% 
50 Mississippi 2.2%  Mississippi 2.6% 
51 West Virginia 1.6%   West Virginia 1.7% 
Note: This table reports the states with the largest and smallest 
immigrant percentages of their total populations in the 2007 and 2012 
iterations of the ACS. 
!
       
Table 4: Comparison of Samples of Self-Employed Individuals in  
the 2007 and 2012 SBO and ACS 
 Owners of Employer Firms Self-Employed Individuals and Owners of Employer Firms  








Education:        
- Less than High School 
Education 
8.4% 2.2% 11.6% 3.7% 22.2% 6.0% 
- High School and Some 
College 
42.6% 46.9% 44.5% 49.6% 45.2% 56.2% 
- Bachelor's Degree and 
Higher 
49.1% 50.9% 43.9% 46.7% 32.7% 37.8% 
Age:        
- ACS: 18 - 29  
- SBO: 18 - 25 
1.0% 1.5% 2.5% 4.7% 7.4% 7.2% 
- ACS: 30 - 50 
- SBO: 25 - 54 
83.7% 77.8% 81.3% 72.4% 62.8% 53.3% 
- ACS: 51 - 64 
- SBO: 55 - 64 
15.3% 20.6% 16.3% 22.9% 29.8% 39.5% 
Female  31.9% 31.8% 38.9% 40.2% 32.5% 30.8% 
Note: The SBO 2007 sample of owners of employer firms includes individuals whose firms are incorporated, non-public, 
employers, founded from 2003 to 2007, and for whom data is available on their birthplace, education, age, and gender.  The SBO 
sample of self-employed individuals and owners of employer firms includes individuals who are self-employed and those whose 
firms are non-public, incorporated, employers, founded from 2003 to 2007 and for whom data is available on their birthplace, 
education, age, and gender.  There are no requirements that the individual employ others.  The ACS 2007 and 2012 samples of 
self-employed individuals and business owners include individuals for whom data is available on their birthplace, education, age, 
gender, and whether they are self-employed full-time.   
!
   
Table 5: Percentages of Self-Employed 
Immigrants and Non-Immigrants  




2007 10.5% 10.1% 
2012 9.7% 8.3% 
Note: This table presents the percentages of 
the immigrant and non-immigrant populations 
who report being self-employed in an 
incorporated business.  The ACS 2007 and 
2012 samples of self-employed individuals 
include individuals for whom data is available 
on their birthplace whether they are self-
employed full-time.   
!
    
Table 6: Sources of Start-Up Capital By Immigrant Status of Owner(s)  
 Owner Composition of Firm 
Source of Capital Immigrant-Only 
Non-Immigrant-
Only Mixed 
Personal Savings 70.3% 69.8% 72.4% 
Other Personal Assets 9.5% 12.7% 14.1% 
Home Equity 12.9% 13.5% 18.0% 
Credit Cards 14.6% 18.1% 19.5% 
Government Loan 1.0% 1.5% 1.9% 
Government Guaranteed 
Loan 
1.1% 2.0% 2.2% 
Bank Loan 13.8% 18.4% 18.6% 
Loan from Family/Friends 4.9% 4.7% 6.1% 
Venture Capitalist 0.5% 0.8% 2.3% 
Grant 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 
Other 3.1% 3.1% 4.5% 
None Needed 5.8% 7.3% 4.4% 
Note: This table presents the percentage of firms in the 2007 SBO who report using each type of 
start-up capital by the composition of the firms' owners.  It is possible for firms to report multiple 
sources of start-up capital.  Thus, the columns do not sum to 100%.  The sample of firms in the 
SBO include incorporated, non-public, employer firms, founded from 2003 to 2007 and for which 
data is available on the birthplaces of the owner(s).    
!
Immigrants Non-Immigrants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Probability of Self-Employment Probability of Self-Employment
Female -0.0412*** -0.0538*** -0.0412*** -0.0412*** -0.0413*** -0.0412*** -0.0595*** -0.0632*** -0.0595*** -0.0595*** -0.0595*** -0.0595***
(0.000648) (0.000851) (0.000648) (0.000648) (0.000648) (0.000648) (0.000250) (0.000294) (0.000250) (0.000250) (0.000250) (0.000250)
Education 
High School and Some College 0.0108*** -0.00448*** 0.0108*** 0.0108*** 0.0108*** 0.0108*** -0.0201*** -0.0427*** -0.0201*** -0.0201*** -0.0201*** -0.0201***
(0.000855) (0.00122) (0.000855) (0.000855) (0.000855) (0.000855) (0.000582) (0.000742) (0.000582) (0.000582) (0.000582) (0.000582)
Bachelor's Degree and Higher -0.00131 -0.0349*** -0.00129 -0.00131 -0.00131 -0.00131 -0.0104*** -0.0555*** -0.0104*** -0.0104*** -0.0104*** -0.0104***
(0.000929) (0.00132) (0.000929) (0.000929) (0.000929) (0.000929) (0.000602) (0.000774) (0.000602) (0.000602) (0.000602) (0.000602)
Age
30 - 50 0.0557*** 0.0641*** 0.0557*** 0.0557*** 0.0557*** 0.0557*** 0.0538*** 0.0575*** 0.0538*** 0.0538*** 0.0538*** 0.0538***
(0.000943) (0.00151) (0.000943) (0.000943) (0.000943) (0.000943) (0.000359) (0.000472) (0.000359) (0.000359) (0.000359) (0.000359)
51 - 60 0.0843*** 0.0947*** 0.0843*** 0.0843*** 0.0843*** 0.0843*** 0.0891*** 0.0935*** 0.0891*** 0.0891*** 0.0891*** 0.0891***
(0.00117) (0.00172) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.000392) (0.000493) (0.000392) (0.000392) (0.000392) (0.000392)
Income Ratio -0.00710 -0.0214*** -0.00520 -0.00794 -0.00892 -0.00752 0.00906** -0.0216*** 0.00686 0.00517 0.00756* 0.00399
(0.00593) (0.00787) (0.00605) (0.00594) (0.00601) (0.00597) (0.00372) (0.00438) (0.00450) (0.00376) (0.00436) (0.00386)
Home Owner 0.0315*** 0.0315*** 0.0315*** 0.0315*** 0.0315*** 0.0254*** 0.0254*** 0.0254*** 0.0253*** 0.0254***
(0.000714) (0.000714) (0.000714) (0.000714) (0.000714) (0.000320) (0.000320) (0.000320) (0.000320) (0.000320)
Home Value 0.0492*** 0.0469***
(0.000569) (0.000196)
Years in the U.S. 0.000509*** 0.000153*** 0.000509*** 0.000510*** 0.000509*** 0.000509***
(2.95e-05) (3.81e-05) (2.95e-05) (2.95e-05) (2.95e-05) (2.95e-05)
Number of Loans < $100,000 0.00102*** 0.000493***
(0.000273) (8.28e-05)
Number of Loans < $250,000 -0.0188 0.0108**
(0.0146) (0.00470)
Number of Loans < $1,000,000 -0.000390 -0.0138**
(0.0153) (0.00585)
Gross Number of Loans 0.00140*** 0.00110***
(0.000447) (0.000167)
Loan Amount < $100,000 4.89e-05 8.40e-05***
(3.63e-05) (1.36e-05)
Loan Amount < $250,000 -0.000134 3.45e-05
(0.000113) (3.66e-05)
Loan Amount < $1,000,000 3.74e-05 -2.22e-05
(7.76e-05) (2.59e-05)
Gross Loan Amount 2.61e-05 6.64e-05***
(4.25e-05) (1.36e-05)
Constant 0.105*** -0.419*** 0.0850*** 0.0877*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.125*** -0.340*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.122***
(0.00855) (0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0101) (0.0134) (0.0103) (0.00566) (0.00695) (0.00605) (0.00578) (0.00599) (0.00571)
Observations 954,720 606,249 954,720 954,720 954,720 954,720 5,560,766 4,363,642 5,560,766 5,560,766 5,560,766 5,560,766
R-squared 0.023 0.033 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.041 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 7: Individual-Level OLS Regressions of Individual- and State-Level Characteristics on Likelihood of Being Self-Employed
Note: The dependent variable in these regressions is an indicator for whether an individual is self-employed.  These regressions estimate the effect of various individual-level characteristics, such 
as gender, education, home ownership, home value, years in the U.S. (if the individual is an immigrant), and state-level characteristics, such as loan availability, on the dependent variable.  The 
dependent variable and invidual-level characteristics come from the 2007 and 2012 iterations of the ACS.  The loan data comes from Community Reinvestment Act data.  State and year fixed 
effects are included in all regressions.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Significance at the .01, .05, and .1 levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
  
Table 8: OLS Regression of State-Level Characteristics of the 




Share of Immigrant-Owned 
New Businesses 
    
Immigrant Percentage of State 
Population 1.113*** 
 (0.0672) 
Home Ownership Rate -0.00157* 
 (0.000858) 
Education  
High School and Some College -0.00145 
 (0.00107) 
Bachelor's Degree and Higher 0.00289*** 
 (0.000634) 
Age  
30 - 50  0.00220 
 (0.00224) 









Year FE YES 
Note: The dependent variable in this regression is the share of 
immigrant-owned new businesses in each state, calculated using the 
2007 and 2012 SBO. These regressions estimate state-level 
characteristics of the immigrant population and industries in a state on 
the dependent variable.  The independent variables that describe each 
state's immigrant population, such as the immigrant percentage of the 
state population, home ownership rate, education levels, and age 
levels, are calculated using the 2007 and 2012 ACS.  MHHI is 
calculated using County Business Patterns (CPS) data.  Year fixed 
effects are included in the regression.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Significance at the .01, .05, and .1 levels are indicated by 
***, **, and *, respectively.   
!
Country Total Number Total Percent Country Total Number Total Percent
Total (all countries) 331,206 100% Total (all countries) 270,981 100%
1 India 161,561 48.9% India 135,329 49.9%
2 China, People's Republic 27,330 8.3% China, People's Republic 23,638 8.7%
3 Canada 12,726 3.9% Canada 10,996 4.1%
4 Philippines 10,389 3.1% Philippines 8,870 3.3%
5 United Kingdom 9,682 2.9% Korea 7,470 2.8%
6 Korea 6,468 2.0% United Kingdom 5,995 2.2%
7 Pakistan 6,313 1.9% Japan 5,181 1.9%
8 Japan 5,902 1.8% Taiwan 3,919 1.4%
9 Taiwan 5,808 1.8% Pakistan 3,781 1.4%
10 Colombia 3,703 1.1% Mexico 3,435 1.3%
2001 2006
Table 9: H-1B Petitions Approved by Country of Birth of Beneficiary in 2001 and 2006 (Top 10 Countries) 
Note: This table reports the total number of approved H-1B petitions in 2001 and 2006 by the country of birth of the beneficiary.  Only the ten 
countries with the greatest number of approved beneficiaries are reported.  Thus, the total approved petitions of each country will not sum to the 
total of "all countries."  Beneficiaries include foreign workers recieving visas for initial and continued employment.  
Source: Reports and Studies.  (February 22, 2017).  Retrieved April 20, 2017 from https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/reports-and-
studies.
Occupation Total Number Total Percent Occupation Total Number Total Percent
Total (all occupations) 331,206 100% Total (all occupations) 270,981 100%
1 Computer-related occupations 191,397 58.0% Computer-related occupations 130,556 48.4%
2 Occupations in Architecture, Engineering, and Surveying 40,388 12.2% Occupations in Architecture, Engineering, and Surveying 29,883 11.1%
3 Occupations in Administrative Specializations 23,794 7.2% Occupations in Education 25,610 9.5%
4 Occupations in Education 17,431 5.3% Occupations in Administrative Specializations 24,636 9.1%
5 Managers and officials 12,423 3.8% Occupations in Medicine and Health 15,703 5.8%
6 Occupations in Medicine and Health 11,334 3.4% Managers and officials 10,061 3.7%
7 Occupations in Life Sciences 6,492 2.0% Occupations in Life Sciences 7,731 2.9%
8 Occupations in Social Sciences 6,145 1.9% Miscellaneous Professional, Technical, and Managerial 5,962 2.2%
9 Occupations in Mathematics and Physical Sciences 5,772 1.7% Occupations in Mathematics and Physical Sciences 5,949 2.2%
10 Miscellaneous Professional, Technical, and Managerial 5,662 1.7% Occupations in Social Sciences 5,862 2.2%
Table 10: H-1B Petitions Approved by Occupation of Beneficiary in 2001 and 2006 (Top 10 Occupations)
2001 2006
Note: This table reports the total number of approved H-1B petitions in 2001 and 2006 by the occupation of the beneficiary.  Only the ten occupations with the greatest number of approved 
beneficiaries are reported.  Thus, the total number of approved petitions for each occupation will not sum to the total of "all occupations."  Beneficiaries include foreign workers recieving visas for 
initial and continued employment.  
Source: Reports and Studies.  (February 22, 2017).  Retrieved April 20, 2017 from https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/reports-and-studies. 
      
Table 11: Most and Least Dependent States Based on LCA Measure of Dependency 
LCA-Based Dependency 
2001 and 2006 Filings for H-1B Visas Normalized by State Population 
  State 2001   State 2006 
1 District of Columbia 8.35  District of Columbia 3.36 
2 Delaware 4.14  New Jersey 1.46 
3 New Jersey 3.48  Alaska 1.29 
4 California 3.17  Delaware 1.22 
5 Massachusetts 3.04  New York 0.91 
6 Connecticut 2.12  Connecticut 0.87 
7 New York 2.02  Massachusetts 0.83 
8 New Hampshire 1.81  Arizona 0.79 
9 Michigan 1.57  California 0.76 
10 Texas 1.52  Virginia 0.70 
…      
42 Alabama 0.31  Nevada 0.19 
43 Oklahoma 0.30  North Dakota 0.18 
44 South Carolina 0.27  Oklahoma 0.17 
45 West Virginia 0.24  Louisiana 0.17 
46 Alaska 0.24  New Mexico 0.15 
47 Mississippi 0.24  South Dakota 0.13 
48 Maine 0.20  Wyoming 0.12 
49 North Dakota 0.18  Mississippi 0.09 
50 South Dakota 0.08  West Virginia 0.07 
51 Montana 0.05   Montana 0.05 
Note: This table reports the states with the largest and smallest dependencies on the 
H-1B program.  The 2001 and 2006 LCA-based measures of dependency are 
calculated as the sum of foreign workers requested in LCAs in a state normalized by 
the state population.  These dependencies are used to calculate the LCA instruments.   
!
      
Table 12: Most and Least Dependent States Based on ACS Measure of Dependency  
ACS-Based Dependency 
2001 and 2006 Percentages of Immigrants from China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, 
Singapore, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh 
  State 2001   State 2006 
1 New York 0.0355  New Jersey 0.0446 
2 New Jersey 0.0345  New York 0.0406 
3 California 0.0344  California 0.0369 
4 Hawaii 0.0261  Hawaii 0.0263 
5 Maryland 0.0208  Maryland 0.0250 
6 Massachusetts 0.0202  Massachusetts 0.0241 
7 Illinois 0.0177  Illinois 0.0216 
8 Virginia 0.0172  Connecticut 0.0216 
9 Washington 0.0136  Delaware 0.0215 
10 
District of 
Columbia 0.0136  Virginia 0.0197 
…      
42 West Virginia 0.0024  Vermont 0.0043 
43 Oklahoma 0.0023  South Dakota 0.0041 
44 Mississippi 0.0020  Mississippi 0.0040 
45 North Dakota 0.0020  New Mexico 0.0037 
46 Arkansas 0.0018  Wyoming 0.0031 
47 Maine 0.0018  Arkansas 0.0028 
48 Wyoming 0.0016  Alaska 0.0027 
49 Idaho 0.0014  Idaho 0.0027 
50 South Dakota 0.0012  West Virginia 0.0026 
51 Montana 0.0006   Montana 0.0007 
Note: This table reports the states with the largest and smallest dependencies on the H-1B 
program.  The 2001 and 2006 ACS-based measures of dependency are calculated as the 
sum of the percentages of immigrants from China, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, 
Singapore, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in each state.  These dependencies are used to 
calculate the ACS instruments.  
!
   
Table 13: First-Stage Regressions of LCA and ACS Instruments on the Immigrant 
Percentage of the State Population  
 (1) (2) 
 Immigrant Percentage of Population 
      
LCA IV 0.00223***  
 (0.000637)  
ACS IV  0.537*** 
  (0.0381) 
Home Ownership Rate -0.00438*** 0.000347 
 (0.00119) (0.000798) 
Education   
High School and Some College -0.000571 0.00120 
 (0.00163) (0.000960) 
Bachelor's Degree and Higher -0.00381*** -0.00415*** 
 (0.000851) (0.000512) 
Age   
30 - 50 0.0150*** 0.00338* 
 (0.00285) (0.00194) 
30 - 50 0.0127*** 0.00226 
 (0.00247) (0.00168) 
MHHI -4.58e-05 0.000474*** 
 (0.000176) (0.000101) 
Constant -0.630*** -0.407*** 
 (0.217) (0.131) 
   
Observations 102 102 
R-squared 0.521 0.827 
Year FE YES YES 
Note: This table presents the first-stage regressions of the instrumental variable 
models.  The dependent variable in these regressions is the immigrant share of the 
population of each state, calculated using the 2007 and 2012 ACS. These 
regressions separately estimate the effects of the instrumental variables, LCA IV 
and ACS IV, on the immigrant share of the state population in the presence of 
other state-level characteristics.  The LCA and ACS instruments are calculated 
using the LCA and ACS measures of dependency, respectively.  The independent 
variables that describe each state's immigrant population, such as the home 
ownership rate, education levels, and age levels, are calculated using the 2007 and 
2012 ACS.  MHHI is calculated using County Business Patterns (CPS) data.  Year 
fixed effects are included in the regressions.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Significance at the .01, .05, and .1 levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
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Table 14: OLS (1) and Second-Stage Regressions (2) and (3) of Instrumented Immigrant 
Percentage of the State Population on the State-Level Share of Immigrant-Owned New 
Businesses 
 Share of Immigrant-Owned New Businesses 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS LCA IV ACS IV 
        
Immigrant Percentage of State 
Pop. 1.113*** 1.348*** 1.257*** 
 (0.0672) (0.200) (0.0797) 
Home Ownership Rate -0.00157* -0.000190 -0.000722 
 (0.000858) (0.00141) (0.000881) 
Education    
High School and Some College -0.00145 -0.000848 -0.00108 
 (0.00107) (0.00119) (0.00105) 
Bachelor's Degree and Higher  0.00289*** 0.00373*** 0.00341*** 
 (0.000634) (0.000938) (0.000642) 
Age    
30 - 50  0.00220 -0.00190 -0.000318 
 (0.00224) (0.00400) (0.00233) 
51 - 64  0.00319* -0.000536 0.000903 
 (0.00191) (0.00356) (0.00200) 
MHHI -0.000127 -0.000167 -0.000152 
 (0.000114) (0.000120) (0.000112) 
Constant -0.0105 0.168 0.0988 
 (0.156) (0.214) (0.157) 
    
Observations 102 102 102 
R-squared 0.858 0.840 0.851 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents the second-stage regressions of the instrumental variables 
model, in columns (2) and (3), and the original state-level OLS model, in column (1), for 
comparison.  The dependent variable in these regressions in the share of immigrant-
owned new businesses in a state, calculated using the 2007 and 2012 SBO.  These 
regressions estimate the effects of the immigrant percentage of the state population, 
instrumented using either the LCA or ACS instruments, on the dependent variable in the 
presence of other state-level variables.  The results of the first-stage can be seen in Table 
13.  The independent variables that describe each state's immigrant population, such as the 
home ownership rate, education levels, and age levels, are calculated using the 2007 and 
2012 ACS.  MHHI is calculated using County Business Patterns (CPS) data.  Year fixed 
effects are included in the regressions.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance at 
the .01, .05, and .1 levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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